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Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to show that even when integrating the 
findings of behavioral economics, agency theory’s conception of interactions at work 
does not actually account for cooperative behavior. The paper draws on the distinction 
between the concepts of individual and person to critically examine this conception 
and show that, while work is mostly organized on the assumption that workers are 
self-interested individuals, management rhetoric addresses workers as persons in an 
attempt to prompt their cooperation and personal commitment. This managerial 
paradox may partly be due to the prevalent influence of agency theory’s prescriptions 
and has been contributing to a severe deterioration of the quality of working life. But it 
also indicates that agency theory has to confront serious theoretical and prescriptive 
dilemmas. 
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“… men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (Arendt 1958: 7) 
1. Introduction  
The various paradoxes that always marked the world of work have sharpened 
dramatically in recent decades. Pressured by markets and shareholders to 
simultaneously innovate and reduce costs, management responses became ever more 
schizophrenic. On one hand, management rhetoric focuses on trust-building and 
cooperation, thereby addressing workers as persons, i.e. socially embedded beings 
endowed with moral capacity; on the other hand, actual management practices 
tighten control and individualize incentives, thereby addressing workers as individuals, 
i.e. non-cooperative beings predominantly driven by self-interest. This paper argues 
that the sharpening of this paradox might be partly explained and legitimized by the 
prevailing influence of agency theory.  
Agency theory was launched in economics by Jensen and Meckling in 19761. 
Though the agency literature now encompasses different fields and strands, including 
a sociological and organizational integrative approach (Shapiro 2005, Mitnick 1992), 
our focus is on the agency theory of the firm2 and more precisely on its behavioral 
assumptions, which have been adopted by all mainstream economic theories of the 
firm. In addition to its academic influence, agency theory has diffused into the business 
press and business schools and taught to millions of MBA students and executives 
around the world. Goshal (2005) and Duska (1992) contend that agency theory’s 
assumptions have been incorporated in the worldviews of managers, thereby 
becoming a powerful normative model.  
The building block of agency theory is a particular social interaction, namely a 
relationship viewed “as a contract under which one person (the principal(s)) engages 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
                                                          
1
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the third most cited paper in economics of those published since 1970; 
Michael Jensen is the fourth most cited author (Kim et al. 2006). 
2
 Hereafter “agency theory”. 
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delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 
308). This scope of discretion allows rational agents, for whom effort generates 
disutility, to shirk and behave opportunistically at the expense of principals. High 
powered incentives were initially recommended to align the principals’ and agents’ 
interests. But the behavioral economics findings threaten the standard agency 
assumptions by showing that economic behavior is driven by pecuniary incentives but 
also by intrinsic motivations and social preferences, thus making the principal-agent 
relationship substantially more complex. Behavioral agency models have then been 
developed that integrate these non-standard motives. However, a close examination 
reveals that standard and behavioral agency models share a similar structure; the sole 
difference is that additional psychological factors are included in the utility function 
agents are supposed to maximize (Rebitzer and Taylor 2011; Berg and Gigerenzer 
2010).  
The main aim of this paper is to critically examine the agency theory’s 
conception of social interactions at work and related conception of cooperation. We 
proceed by grounding our argument on the distinction between the individual and the 
person. Our purpose is to show that the interpersonal, i.e. relational and moral 
dimensions of the relationships engaged in at workplaces are overlooked in 
(behavioral) agency models. We also briefly characterize the recent evolution of 
management practices to point out how close they are to the individual-based agency 
prescriptions and how deleterious they prove to be for the quality of the person-based 
interactions at work. 
Our argument is structured as follows. We begin in section Two by 
distinguishing between the concepts of individual and person. This distinction serves a 
rhetoric as well as a substantive function throughout the paper aimed at clarifying our 
argument. Section Three examines the evolution of agency theory’s conception of 
social interactions at work since the 1970s and section Four highlights the extent to 
which it departs from a person-based conception of behavior. Section Five presents 
the management rhetoric aimed at mobilizing persons and the actual management 
practices designed to motivate and control individuals. Section Six gives some evidence 
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of the perverse effects of standard agency theory’s prescriptions and makes 
alternative normative recommendations. Section Seven concludes. 
 
2. The concepts of the individual and the person  
All heterodox economists emphasize the need to replace the mainstream atomistic 
conception of the individual with one that is socially embedded, but a change in 
terminology had not yet been envisaged. Conversely, in philosophy and anthropology 
the terms individual and person are employed to single out different views of human 
beings. (It must be mentioned that both concepts are historical creations.) 
While the concept of individual refers to the internal attributes and uniqueness 
of humans primarily conceived as separate beings, the concept of person adds to these 
substantive characteristics the recognition that humans are constitutively social and 
relational (Roger 2012; Harris 1989). In the atomistic, Hobbesian view, humans are 
able to survive and grow outside the world of social interaction but other philosophical 
strands hold that humans are constitutively relational beings. To start with, the genesis 
of the human mind is not monological, something each person accomplishes on 
her/his own, but dialogical, something that results from the exchanges with others, 
namely through language (Taylor 1989). Persons are inextricably shaped by the context 
in which they live and the persons with whom they interact; their preferences and 
goals evolve throughout life under the influence of such interactions. By contrast, the 
concept of individual, defined by his “internal attributes” - stable preferences in 
economics’ jargon – fits well the constitutive feature of homo economicus.  Two 
intertwined traits distinguish the person and the individual: moral capacity and 
relational needs. 
All concepts of person explicitly emphasize the moral/judgmental capacities of 
humans. And moral attributes are inseparable from relations with others and 
language: “I become a person and remain one only as an interlocutor” (Taylor 1985: 
276). Persons are capable of submitting their conduct to shared values and thus of 
honoring their commitments. The concept of person stresses that agents may act 
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against their self-interest to honor their commitments or their duty. This has long been 
argued by Sen (2002) who claims that, since commitment breaks the link between 
individual welfare and the choice of action, the human capacity for commitment 
breaks with rational choice theory.  
By contrast, individuals are seen in mainstream economics as likely to renege 
on their commitments. Hart (2002) maintains that although firms would have difficulty 
surviving in a norm-less society, it cannot be assumed that employers or employees 
are to be trusted to keep their word. He associates keeping one’s promise to 
“irrational” behavior (p. 1705) and explicitly states that self-interested parties are not 
trustworthy parties because there will always be an incentive to break a promise (p. 
1703). Thus, though a “justice motive” – or some other moral norm - is sometimes 
included as an argument in utility functions, this very inclusion implies that justice is a 
tool in the pursuit of (enlightened) self-interest: so long as behaving equitably is 
perceived as maximizing utility, individuals will do so. 
As for relational needs, the person-based tradition highlights the human 
affective vulnerability and struggle for social recognition; persons enter into relations 
with others because of their need for relatedness and social esteem (Honneth 1995).  
And it must be noted that morally-driven behavior necessarily involves both cognition 
and affect (termed “cold” and “hot” motives in psychology). That relational and moral 
motives are intertwined is empirically documented by social psychologists and 
management scholars. For example, managers adhere to justice rules the more they 
experience a positive affect (Scott et al, 2014). Positive affective states trigger pro-
social behavior such as cooperation and reciprocal helping, which have ties to the rules 
of justice. By contrast, for rational choice theory, individuals enter into relationships 
with others when and if they need them to reach their self-goals, not for the 
relationship per se. 
Due to its individual-based behavioral assumptions, mainstream economics 
primarily associates the agency relationship with agency problems, which stands in 
sharp contrast with the notion of agency as first introduced by law scholars. In law, the 
agency relationship presupposes that “the alleged agent and principal have met each 
6 
 
other face to face, or have talked on the telephone, or have otherwise communicated 
in a specific, individualized way” (Clark, 1985: 85). Furthermore, in law, the notion of 
an agent is one who acts for another even at a cost to him/herself (it hence 
corresponds to our notion of person); the laws of agency impose a specific duty of 
loyalty on the agent (Duska, 1992). For Sen (2002), the agency relationship is an 
instance of commitment: the agent sees himself as charged with furthering the 
principal’s interest; he acts as if the principal’s goal is also his own. Mainstream 
economists adopted the notion of agency but removed the attribute of 
loyalty/commitment precisely because of their individual-based conception of human 
behavior. This conception is consistent with their conception of firms as “nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 310). In 
firms, relationships are not different in any substantial way from market relations 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
 Assuming that humans are not loyal or bound to their word in the first place, 
the aim of agency economists is to identify the management practices that would lead 
the agents to fulfill their agency obligations. They do so by concentrating on the 
calculative abilities of individuals, required for utility maximization. But, according to 
law scholars, the functioning of firms does depend on the person-based abilities of 
persons, their communicative and normative capacities. Acknowledging these 
capacities supposes breaking with ontological isolation and recognizing the inter-
subjective ontology of persons (Favereau, 2008).  
 
3. Agency theory’s conception of social interactions at work: costly contractual 
exchanges  
As referred, the agency theory of the firm is grounded on a particular kind of social 
interactions. Firms are a cascade of sequential principal-agent contracts in which 
principals delegate work to agents to act on their behalf. As agents are rational utility-
maximizers, principals must bear costs to mitigate agents’ opportunism. Agency costs 
turned out to be the core concept of agency theory and its core aim is to design 
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contractual arrangements that minimize agency problems. In the first agency models, 
only the vertical - principal-agent - relationships were deemed of interest.  
Horizontal interactions3 among co-workers were nonetheless soon 
acknowledged, under the label of side-contracting. In the eyes of the then leading 
agency theorists, side-contracting takes the form of “bribes, personal relationships and 
promises of reciprocation” (Holstrom and Tirole 1989: 94). These “contracts” that 
agents enter into cannot be fully controlled by principals, which generates agency 
costs and adds “costly constraints to the owners’ optimization problem” (Holstrom and 
Tirole 1989: 3). Side-contracting is hence considered undesirable and firms must take 
measures to prevent it. Suggested measures include the limitation of personal 
relationships through isolation and the restriction of reciprocity through the 
promotion of short-term relationships (Holstrom and Tirole 1989). Nevertheless, in 
passing, these authors comment that the measures they recommend can have 
organizational drawbacks since they may undermine the development of trust, which 
they view as crucial for cooperation. In subsequent papers, side-contracting is 
considered as taking two possible forms, collusion or cooperation, depending on its 
effect on the organization. The incentive structure should then regulate the degree of 
cooperation in order to limit collusion. In short, employers should consider social 
interactions among workers with suspicion.  
These radical assumptions about both vertical and horizontal interactions at 
work softened once the findings of behavioral economics started being taken into 
account. Because it draws on laboratory and field experiments, whose findings differ 
to a great extent from the neoclassical predictions, behavioral economics claims to 
improved empirical realism. Experimental labor economists showed that the 
propensity to provide effort is largely dependent on the nature of social interactions at 
work, and specifically on whether the principal-agent relationship is perceived to be 
trustful and fair (Charness. and Kuhn, 2011). Interactions with co-workers also prove to 
significantly influence the subjects’ productivity. New behavioral assumptions, such as 
                                                          
3
 Observational studies reveal that most workers spend the majority of their time interacting with peers 
rather than with supervisors and subordinates (Le Gall 2011). This illustrates the crucial role of 
horizontal interactions for the functioning of firms. 
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inequity aversion and reciprocity – generically considered “social preferences” -, are 
introduced in extended agency models in the form of arguments into utility functions.   
For example, Rob and Zemsky (2002)’s model assumes that workers derive 
utility from cooperation (defined as reciprocal helping) and that cooperative behavior 
among workers is a source of competitive advantage for organizations. It is recognized 
that “preferences for cooperating” are partly endogenous, which means that 
cooperative behavior may and should be fostered by appropriate incentive systems.  
Likewise, while the first agency theorists assume that workers behave a- or immorally 
towards principals, some recent models elaborate on Akerlof (1982)’s view of labor 
contracts as partial gift exchange. Dur et al (2010) call attention to the many benefits 
good relationships between principals and agents may yield to the firm and emphasize 
the fact that such relationships may motivate workers more powerfully than pecuniary 
incentives. Employees’ effort and the employer’s benevolent treatment of workers are 
modeled as reciprocal gifts, and the signaling of good intentions on the part of 
principals, though costly, appears as a possibly efficient strategy (Non 2012; Sliwska 
2007). 
Although behavioral agency models include “person-based attributes”, their 
structure is the same as that of standard models; both fit the axiomatic formulations of 
rationality (Rebitzer and Taylor 2011; Berg and Gigerenzer 2010). Indeed the models 
referred above, like all social preferences models, assume that individuals maximize a 
behavioral (other-regarding) utility function along with a traditional utility function 
that depends on own payoffs. Utility calculations now also involve psychic 
costs/benefits. The benefits of own payoffs and the psychic benefits/costs derived 
from own or others’ behavior are weighted and summed to produce a utility score for 
each allocation, and choice is by definition the allocation with the highest score (Berg 
and Gigerenzer, 2010). But adding new parameters to the standard utility function 
further complicates the constrained optimization problem faced by agents and 
requires even more heroic assumptions about decision processes and calculation 
abilities. These assumptions are increasingly being denounced as psychologically 
implausible (Baron and Kreps, 2012; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010). 
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The “relational contracts” literature, which emphasizes the role relational 
contracts play in enforcing incomplete contracts, also attempts to instill more realism 
in agency models. Relational contracts are considered efficient when outcomes are not 
contractible ex ante and are observable ex post only by the contracting parties - 
features typical of employment relationships. Agency models define relational 
contracts as informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct (Baker et al. 2002). 
Because the relationships are valuable in the future, the contracting parties do not 
wish to renege on previous commitments. Thus, the honoring of contracts is based on 
self-interested, utility-maximizing, calculations, not relational traits. The aim of agency 
relational contracts models is to design the incentive payments that comprise the 
“necessary and sufficient condition for the relational-employment contract to be self-
enforcing” (Baker et al. 2002: 74-75). 
To sum up, even in the agency models that introduce relational and moral 
motives into utility functions, individuals are calculative rather than relational beings 
(Non 2012; Dur et al 2010; Sliwka 2007). The relational and moral abilities of persons 
are submerged by the self-interested calculative abilities of individuals: relating with 
others and following behavioral norms result from individualistic, enlightened, 
calculations, not from moral capacity: “We do not assume that people follow a social 
norm for its own sake, but we investigate how such a rule is sustained by self-
interested community members” (Kandori 1992: 63).  
Mention must be made of a separate line of behavioral agency theory 
developed by organizational scholars.4 This strand of literature proposes a version of 
agency theory that breaks with the standard assumptions by incorporating, for 
example, bounded rationality and the results of research on choice and uncertainty  -
namely Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (Martin et al 2013). It is also 
acknowledged that other new behavioral assumptions about time discounting, 
inequity aversion and intrinsic motivation influence agents’ and principals’ behavior 
(Pepper and Gore, 2015). Unlike most behavioral economics, this literature does not 
systematically retain the standard utility maximization models.  
                                                          
4
 We thank an anonymous referee for calling our attention to this literature. 
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4. Social interactions at work as drivers of cooperation and major 
distinguishing feature of firms 
The insight that economic agents have other-regarding preferences represents a 
welcome expansion of standard agency models. It helps in understanding cooperation 
but still provides an insufficient account of it. Cooperation is critically required by 
modern production processes, characterized by high levels of uncertainty and strong 
interdependence. Most workers have to constantly engage in binding social 
interactions and mutual commitments to establish the common understandings and 
routines necessary for each to contribute her/his part to the productive endeavor. This 
section proposes a person-based conception of cooperation and highlights its 
differences with the individual-based conception.  
Cooperating implies (a) giving up on one’s desire to cheat or exploit cooperative 
partners and (b) expecting that others cooperate too. Requisite (a) means that workers 
must commit themselves to the pursuit of the previously set goal rather than the one-
sided pursuit of self-interest – a behavior that unrelated and self-interested individuals 
would not exhibit if it happens to diverge from their private interest. Requisite (b) 
means that compliance with commitments and expectations about others’ behavior 
acquires crucial importance. Yet, individuals who do not abide by social norms for their 
own sake would not expect co-workers to cooperate.  
In fact, it is the relational needs and moral abilities of persons that both 
establish and enforce mutual expectations. More precisely, workers cooperate 
because this produces mutually beneficial outcomes but also because it provides the 
opportunity to enter into interactions that satisfy the human need for relatedness.  
The notion of “relational goods”, defined as the communicative, cognitive and 
affective components generated by the interpersonal relations one enters into (Bruni 
2008; Gui 2000; Uhlaner 1989), has been advanced to designate the relationships that 
are intrinsically motivated. But it is to be noted that cooperating gives rise to relational 
goods only if and when the interacting workers jointly value it. Bruni et al (2014) show 
that cooperation depends on the value that one’s interacting partners give to 
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cooperating. Relational goods (friendship, camaraderie, reciprocal helping) are more 
than just a combination of private goods; they go beyond the individualistic derivation 
of utility to the extent that they require a common valuation (Lopes 2011). Relational 
goods explain why workers do not systematically exploit cooperative partners 
(requisite (a)). 
Cooperating also involves a series of mutual commitments that, depending on 
whether or not they are honored, result in moral goods/bads (e.g. feeling fairly treated 
and respected versus deceived and humiliated). Moral goods may be defined as the 
outputs of a moral nature generated by the social interactions one enters into (Lopes 
2011). Moral goods involve and require the common valuation of the norms that guide 
the actions of the interacting workers. The normative appeal of moral norms derives 
precisely from their being commonly shared. The fact that moral norms prescribe 
actions that may lead to acting contrary to self-interest is of special importance. 
Indeed, only persons abiding by moral norms can expect others, whom they know 
share the same norms, to also abide by them even when it runs counter to their 
interest. The existence of moral goods explains how requisite (b) is met.  
To sum up, cooperative behavior at work cannot be accounted for without 
considering the role played by relational and moral goods in motivating and sustaining 
cooperation. As such, these goods may be seen as a kind of productive factor. While 
cooperation undoubtedly entails a calculative facet, it also inevitably calls for the 
relational and moral capacity of persons. Only morally able persons can effectively 
enter into commitments with others, be them colleagues or principals. Figure 1 
synthesizes the differences between the person and the individual-based conceptions 
of cooperation. 
Figure 1: The person-based and the individual-based conception of human beings and 
cooperation 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
Although the behavioral developments of agency theory recognize the 
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cooperative dispositions of workers, the way in which the latter are modeled does not 
actually acknowledge their relational and moral nature. To begin with, agency theory 
does not consider cooperation as an outcome of continued social interactions; that is, 
it is not viewed as a collective endeavor rendered possible by constitutive traits of 
humans. Rather, cooperating is considered a residual kind of behavior: “voluntary 
cooperation is defined as the difference between actual and privately optimal effort” 
(Non 2012: 322). The decision to cooperate is taken separately by each worker 
depending on her/his preferences rather than emerging from the fact that workers are 
engaged in a collective venture. Cooperative dispositions, or any other ad hoc social 
preference, are introduced into the individualistic theoretical apparatus by adding 
arguments of a different nature into a single utility function. But this operation actually 
overlooks the interpersonal dimension of social interactions, i.e. their specific affective 
and moral nature. 
Firstly, in interactions at work, the identity of the person with whom one 
interacts has affective significance. Sugden (2005), inspired by Smith’s notion of 
sympathy, argues that what occurs in interpersonal interactions is a correspondence of 
sentiments, i.e., a two-way interaction at the level of sentiments and emotions. It is the 
mutual awareness of the correspondence of sentiments that makes it a truly 
interpersonal phenomenon and that confers subjective (affective) value to 
interpersonal relations (hence the term relational goods). What behavioral economics 
calls “social preferences” are often actually affective states. Yet, for Sugden, affective 
states cannot be considered preferences, “they are not, as preferences are, 
comparative relations among objectively described options; rather, they are our 
subjective experiences of the world” (Sugden 2005:54). These experiences influence 
the process of preference formation and hence cannot be assimilated to preferences. 
Being neither preferences nor beliefs, affective states do not fit into the ontological 
framework of rational choice theory (Sugden 2005); their inclusion in utility functions 
may well be illegitimate. 
Secondly, as referred above, Sen (2002) contends that commitment or moral 
motives in general cannot be reduced to arguments in utility functions because actions 
driven by duty are “counterpreferential”. Acting in committed ways, i.e. to further the 
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goals of another party or of a group, is not representable within the belief-desire 
schema. Additionally, the specific features of moral behavior, namely discontinuity, 
“lumpiness” and non-marginality, raise serious technical issues when it comes to 
modeling. But even the authors who propose models that acknowledge these 
specificities and make them consistent with the economic view of rational behavior 
point out that straightforwardly assuming tradeoffs between moral and non-moral 
considerations may well be illegitimate (Dowell et al, 1998). That is, they feel 
uncomfortable with the assumption of universal commensurability between 
arguments of a different nature. Can a price be assigned to the “psychic cost” of not 
having honored a commitment and can it then be lumped together with ordinary costs 
and benefits? 
In sum, the desire to propose models that fit the axiomatic formulations of 
rationality leads behavioral agency theorists to downplay the abilities of the person. 
This downplaying is consistent with agency theory’s conception of the firm which, in 
defining firms as “privately owned markets” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 795), is in fact 
claiming that the functioning of firms does not require morally-driven behavior. The 
argument developed in this paper is just the opposite. One of the basic distinguishing 
features of firms when compared to markets is that firms provide the opportunity for 
intensive interpersonal relationships. It is precisely the unspecified obligations and the 
relational goods deriving from social interactions that, combined with the economic 
advantages of cooperation, contribute both to generating the desire to cooperate and 
to rendering cooperation sustainable. In short, while mainstream economics assumes 
that relationships established within firms are like those established in markets5 - that 
is, contracts between individuals - we consider that within firms workers establish 
relationships as persons because they are engaged together in productive endeavors. 
Relational and moral goods may obviously also be “bads” (animosity, 
disrespect, resentment, etc), in which case they can be destructive for the workers’ 
well-being and organizational performance. The fact that workers are persons as 
defined above does not obviate that they do often behave as self-interested, indeed 
                                                          
5
 In a footnote though, Holmstrom (1999: 89, footnote 14) notes that “the evidence suggests that the 
nature of external contracting is quite different from internal contracting”. 
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immoral individuals. Moreover, because of their high emotional potential, 
personalized interactions can disrupt cooperation more than impersonal contexts. It is 
therefore of prime importance that work environments allow the nurturing of 
relational/moral goods to avoid the losses and inefficiencies caused by 
relational/moral bads.  
 
5. From mobilizing persons to managing individuals - towards the 
depersonalization and individualization of work 
 
The individual-based and the person-based conception of social interactions and 
cooperation lead to very different normative prescriptions. The aim of this section is to 
show that while the person-based conception underlies management rhetoric, it is the 
individual-based rationale as conveyed by agency models and prescriptions that seems 
to inspire management practices.  
Managers know that cooperation is indispensable to achieve profitability and 
foster innovation. They also know that workers are morally-endowed persons who, for 
the most part, are willing to behave cooperatively rather than opportunistically. They 
therefore try to draw workers into a cooperative endeavor by asking them to invest 
themselves in work cognitively and affectively. The prevailing management rhetoric 
solicits the mobilization of the “whole person”, i.e. requires that workers internalize 
the organizational goals and commit themselves to achieving them. Indeed, the 
workers’ loyalty is more efficiently fostered through internalized commitment than 
through obedience, technical prescriptions and bureaucratic control.6  
Management rhetoric puts strong emphasis on trust and the cooperative spirit. 
To be consistent, management practices should give great leeway to workers and 
                                                          
6
 This raises a crucial issue: the fact that workers as persons need to nurture good relationships and are 
prone to behave cooperatively is often used by firms to manipulate them and perpetuate oppression in 
the name of overcoming it (Alvesson and Willmont 1992). Our intent is obviously to argue that firms 
must acknowledge the social and moral abilities of workers without using them to further exploit 
workers. 
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signal that they trust them, which means enhanced autonomy at work, decentralized 
decision-making and workers' participation, above-market pay, collective rewards and 
job security. This would foster a kind of relationship between workers and the 
organization based on “partial-gift exchanges” (Akerlof 1982), in which workers 
reciprocate in effort and dedication the trust and good working conditions offered to 
them. If firms fail to honor their commitments, workers disengage from the moral 
obligations that such practices are supposed to generate. 
In fact, evidence shows that firms’ practices habitually break the “psychological 
contracts” presumed in the cooperative rhetoric (Thompson 2013). The trends that 
characterize the world of work to-day7 sharply depart from the rhetoric of trust-
building and empowerment and have instead converged with the prescriptions of early 
agency models. To minimize the agency problems generated by the workers’ pursuit of 
their self-interest, Jensen and Meckling (1976) prescribed two kinds of arrangements: 
(a) incentives and compensation schemes aimed at aligning the principals’ and agents’ 
interests (particularly recommended for top corporate executives) and (b) control 
devices aimed at keeping self-serving behavior in check and providing information 
about what agents are actually doing. 
As for incentives, schemes such as performance-related pay, individualized and 
quantified performance targets, performance rankings and rising wage differentials are 
being widely implemented to boost productivity. Most performance measurement 
practices assign objectives and accountability for outcomes to individuals despite task 
and functional interdependencies. Larkin et al (2012) reveal that over 83% of papers 
on compensation in the leading strategy journals in the 2000s rest on standard agency 
theory rather than social psychology or behavioral decision research. The human 
activity of work is being translated in quantitative terms, in all economic sectors, to fit 
the constraints of financial analysis. It is the outcomes of work that are focused on, not 
the workers as persons. The subjective and collective experience of work is largely 
overlooked.  
                                                          
7
 The trends referred below are over-simplified. Actual practices are much more nuanced, depending 
also on the kind of industry and occupation. For example, pay-for-performance schemes are very 
frequent for executives but rare for non-executives (Larkin et al, 2012). By contrast, wage inequalities 
increased almost everywhere. 
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As for monitoring, direct types of control, such as surveillance and giving 
orders, are replaced by “unobstructive” controls like standardization, involvement of 
workers in the setting of their performance targets, individualized and quantified 
appraisal systems, extensive reporting procedures and other sophisticated devices 
that, thanks to the new management technologies, often conceal their true nature. 
The outcome is an overall decline in perceived autonomy at work in the last two/three 
decades (Lopes et al. 2014). These trends in the evolution of work are reinforced by 
those in the evolution of employment, marked by depressed labor markets and a 
decline in job security.  
There is nothing new in the observation of a gap between managerial words 
and deeds; the novelty lies in its marked increase. Management rhetoric advocates 
personal commitment and trust-building, but in practice firms invest in increasingly 
sophisticated surveillance and control devices. The person-individual distinction 
captures this paradox: firms want workers to involve themselves at work as persons 
but they organize work as if workers were opportunistic individuals in need of strict 
direction and monitoring. By individualizing incentives, controls and rewards, firms rely 
on the self-interest of workers and their competitive dispositions rather than on their 
trustworthiness and cooperative dispositions. In the end, is organizational efficiency 
best served by competition, rivalry and envy, or by mutual trust and reciprocity as 
advocated in management rhetoric8? 
 Since work is not only a means to consumption but also an opportunity for 
workers to realize their potential and satisfy their social needs, workers tend to 
subjectively engage in their work and actually devote large amounts of cognitive and 
emotional resources to it. Thus, to the growing gap between management rhetoric and 
practices corresponds an increasing divergence between the workers’ expectations of 
meaningful work and the working conditions they actually face. The individualization 
and depersonalization of work hence creates a tension between the need for 
meaningful work, which necessarily includes the feeling of usefully contributing to and 
being part of a community, and the pressure to enter into a competitive, zero-sum 
                                                          
8
 According to a French survey, 87% of employers believe that the individualization of wages motivates 
employees but 40% declare that the rivalries it creates destroys the collective spirit. 
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game. On the one hand, workers involve themselves as persons in work9 but, on the 
other, they are compelled to behave as self-centered individuals to meet the 
quantitative objectives set by management, hence contributing to the erosion of the 
cooperative spirit needed for their psychological well-being. If one could observe the 
relational and moral goods at work, one would certainly see them regressing.  
These management practices have resulted in a considerable intensification of 
work, increasing levels of stress and emotional exhaustion, substitution of extrinsic for 
intrinsic motivations and the dissolution of collective solidarities. Intensification of 
work is reported as being accompanied by a decrease in the time available for 
socializing - fewer “non-productive” moments; less time to learn, teach or help; fewer 
opportunities to meet and communicate – as well as by a general depersonalization 
and deterioration of work relations (Le Gall 2011). The increase in work-related social 
and psychological problems is a good indicator of this unprecedented deterioration in 
the quality of working life. In the last decades, the workers’ vulnerability and psycho-
social disorders have intensified considerably (Netterstrom et al. 2008; Siegrist 2006). 
Burn-out and stress, feelings of isolation, and feelings of culpability when performance 
targets are not met have become prevalent phenomena of contemporary workplaces 
(Le Gall 2011).  
 
6. The perverse effects of standard agency theory’s prescriptions and beyond 
 
Although as yet the existence of a direct link between the evolution of management 
practices and the influence of agency theory is insufficiently empirically documented10, 
a number of papers convincingly argue that agency theory’s basic assumptions have 
become a dominant ideology, and consequently a powerful normative model (Roger et 
al 2012; Goshal 2005; Roberts 2005; Duska 1992). As mentioned, the standard 
prescriptions of agency theory emphasize pecuniary incentives and control devices. 
                                                          
9
 It must be noted that workers may be committed to their work but not to the organization in which 
they work (Cushen and Thompson 2012), which further amplifies the paradoxical situation.  
10
 Zajac and Westphal (2004) studied the processes in which agency theory’s prescriptions translate in 
financial market behavior. Other studies of this kind are much needed. 
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A now large amount of empirical evidence, collected by social psychologists, 
experimental economists and organizational scholars, shows that pecuniary rewards 
and tight control may have deleterious and counterproductive effects on intrinsic 
motivation (Larkin et al 2012, Charness and Kuhn 2011, Deci and Ryan 2000). Indeed, 
strict monitoring is shown to threaten the sense of personal autonomy, thereby 
damaging self-esteem and decreasing intrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci 2005). 
When workers are excessively controlled, intrinsic motivation is supplanted by 
defensive or self-protective processes such as the tendency to withdraw concern for 
one’s job and focus on oneself (Deci & Ryan 2000).  Workers then tend to adhere to 
more materialistic values and behave less cooperatively. Sheldon et al. (2004) show 
that workers involved in controlling environments declare to be less satisfied at work 
and more focused on pay and benefits.  
In the same vein, the use of monitoring tools by managers leads them to 
distrust workers and triggers a pathological spiral. These processes are well-known by 
psychologists: “Surveillants come to distrust their targets as a result of their own 
surveillance and targets in fact become unmotivated and untrustworthy. The target is 
now demonstrably untrustworthy and requires more intensive surveillance, and the 
increased surveillance further damages the target. Trust and trustworthiness both 
deteriorate” (cited in Goshal 2005: 85). This counterproductive effect has been shown 
to also affect top executives, for whom it is recommended that compensation schemes 
are aligned with shareholders’ interests. Many of the reforms set up to curb top 
executives’ opportunism in the last decades ended up augmenting rather than 
diminishing the governance problem (Roberts 2005). 
That is, instead of mitigating opportunistic behavior, the standard agency 
prescriptions may actually enhance opportunism (Goshal 2005; Roberts 2005). The 
trend towards the quantification of work, for example, may result in workers engaging 
in individual gain calculations rather than exercising their person-based abilities. As 
Hannah Arendt (1958) brilliantly contended, the danger with theories is not so much 
that they are false, it is that they may become true. In assuming that people are 
opportunistic and primarily motivated by pecuniary motives, agency theory may 
contribute to making people be just like that.  
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The behavioral agency models take stock of these perverse effects but stick to 
designing more appropriate incentive structures rather than devising adequate 
organizational solutions. For Rebitzer and Taylor (2011), it is pay structures that have 
to perform the multiple duties of motivating workers, signaling the principal’s 
trustworthiness, making workers identify with the organization and taking account of 
agents’ intrinsic motivations and social preferences. Rob and Zemsky (2002), who 
assume that cooperating increases the workers’ utility, recommend that pecuniary 
incentives be set so as not to crowd out the workers’ cooperative dispositions; but 
they say nothing about how these may be fostered though they recognize that 
cooperative dispositions are endogenous to the work context. Similarly, since it is now 
acknowledged that monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic motivations, high-powered 
incentives are considered “inefficient”. Holmstrom (1999: 89) states that firms must 
often suppress “excessively strong incentives on individually measured performance 
for the benefit of enhancing the effectiveness of more delicate and subtle instruments 
aimed at encouraging cooperation”. But nothing is said about what the content of 
these “subtle instruments”. Besides, low-powered incentives are now assumed to 
potentially attract workers with high intrinsic motives, which may subsequently 
promote high effort work norms (Sliwka 2007). Notwithstanding, according to agency 
theory, this kind of incentive structure always entails a second-best situation. 
In fact, the inclusion of social and moral preferences in principal-agent models 
results in contradictory claims and prescriptions. In Non (2012), for example, the good 
treatment of workers by managers is modeled as a cost for firms. So are cooperation 
and satisfying interactions a cost or an efficiency-enhancing factor?  
Though behavioral economists declare their models to be purely descriptive, 
their findings may have serious effects on prescription. If “social preferences” were 
taken seriously, prescriptions should include not only adjustments in incentives but 
also recommendations about how to design social interactions at work – including 
hierarchical interactions, for it must be borne in mind that workplaces are structured 
in terms of the authority of managers. Bruni et al (2014) provide a fruitful indication: 
their evolutionary model shows that cooperation is enhanced both by social rewards 
for cooperation – i.e., the use of material rewards to signal social recognition – and by 
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high frequency of social interactions. A mix of objective and subjective incentives is 
better at driving cooperation than sanctions and tight control. Hargreaves Heap (2013) 
insightfully suggests that, rather than assuming opportunism, managers should 
consider which preferences they would like to develop and adjust organizational 
structures accordingly. 
In fact, contrary to what agency theory assumes, and as management rhetoric 
shows, real-world firms do expect workers to be loyal, conduct themselves in a 
trustworthy and cooperative manner and honor the non-contracted obligations 
inherent in incomplete contracts. Because the very existence of firms is justified by the 
possibility of cooperation, prescriptions should focus on fostering cooperative 
dispositions rather than trying to economize on and indeed discard the person-based 
moral and social capacities. This implies recognizing that firms are not nexus for 
contracts but rather organizations, and that management not only involves conceiving 
incentive systems but also designing organizational structures. 
Managerial perspicacity cannot be relied upon to prevent firms and workers 
from being increasingly caught in the paradoxes described above. There is no robust 
evidence showing that cooperative or participative firms are more profitable than 
exploitive ones. It may well be the contrary since the externalization of social costs 
may compensate for motivational losses. The effective implementation of 
management’s rhetoric, if it is not to be manipulative, demands giving much voice and 
power to workers, something most employers are certainly not prone to do; 
institutional changes that further the workers’ rights are required. But to be effective 
changes in labor law that foster the workers’ voice11 must be necessarily accompanied 
by changes in corporate law that institutionalize the workers’ participation in the 
corporate governance structures. Questioning the behavioral foundations of agency 
theory hence leads us to acknowledging a need for juridical and economic regulation 
of firm governance - which is precisely what the launching of agency theory wanted 
(and succeeded) to avoid in the 1970s (Gindis 2013). 
                                                          
11
 In many countries, several voice mechanisms are formally available that are actually not or rarely used 
– given the present broad economic context, changes in labor law alone do not suffice. 
21 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The paper begins by distinguishing the notions of individual and person and then draws 
on this distinction to i) critically examine agency theory’s conception of interactions at 
work and ii) show that management rhetoric addresses workers as persons but actually 
organizes work as if workers were opportunistic individuals. While the concept of 
individual in mainstream economics defines humans as unique and separate beings 
engaged in the pursuit of self-centered goals, the concept of person defines them as 
constitutively social, morally-endowed beings prone to cooperative behavior.  
Being built on the specific interaction between a principal and an agent, the 
early agency models focused on the agency costs deriving from the misalignment of 
these interacting partners’ interests. But presently most agency models integrate the 
findings of behavioral economics (in the form of psychological arguments in utility 
functions) and provide a more complex picture of social interactions at work, of their 
efficiency character and of their impact on incentive systems. Notwithstanding this 
substantive enlargement of the domain of economics, the way in which the – person-
based – “social preferences” and “moral dispositions” have been introduced in agency 
theory leaves the individualistic utility-maximization framework unquestioned. Even 
though the mainstream begins to explicitly consider the employment relationship a 
“social relationship” (Baron and Kreps, 2012), the fact that work in firms necessarily 
entails personally relating with others continue to be actually disregarded. This is due 
to the incapacity of the atomistic ontology of the rational choice paradigm to 
effectively cope with the cooperative facet of work.  
By contrast, the distinctive methodological feature of our approach, i.e. the 
focus on the interpersonal dimension, allows us to uncover the powerful role played 
by social interactions in work organizations. We argue that cooperation, on which the 
functioning of modern productive processes depends, as signaled by management 
rhetoric, requires the social and moral abilities of persons to be effectively established 
and sustained. A meaningful theory of the firm should hence conceive it as a “system 
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of cooperative services of persons” rather than just the “sum of services of individuals” 
(Barnard 1938: 110, our italics). That is, the behavioral assumption placed at the core 
of the theory of the firm should consider both the cooperative dispositions and the 
self-interested dimension of human behavior. The study of social interactions at work, 
in particular, deserves greater attention than it has received so far. 
The processes of individualization and depersonalization that mark present-day 
work are very much in line with agency theory’s standard prescriptions. Beyond the 
deeply deleterious effects they have on the workers’ well-being, these processes may 
be fostering the opportunism they were supposed to restrain. Recognizing that the 
good functioning of firms and their creativity necessitates treating workers as persons 
rather than individuals leads to questioning firms’ governance structure. In order to 
compel firms to be more consistent with their own rhetoric, major institutional 
changes are required. 
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